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SCRUTINY OF OSHA REGULATIONS IN THE COURTS: A STUDY
OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
I. INTRODUCTION
Little trace of the concept of judicial deference' can be found in the Fifth
Circuit's recent ruling in American Petroleum Institute v. Occupational
Safety and Health Administration.2 Aganist the background of a slowly
emerging body of law regarding the scope of judicial review of Occupa-
tional Safety and Health Administration3 regulations, the Fifth Circuit's
decision represents a bold extension of the court's authority to define the
parameters of OSHA's regulatory authority. Whether this case in fact
signals a new wave of judicial activism will soon be determined by the
United States Supreme Court.' But regardless of the Supreme Court's
ultimate resolution of the issues presented, the API case invites analysis
as a primary example of judicial involvement in an unsettled and contro-
versial area of law.
In API, the role of the judiciary in OSHA's regulatory scheme was
stretched beyond existing precedent on two fronts. First, the court held
that OSHA had an affirmative obligation to engage in a risk-benefit-cost
analysis5 of its proposed regulations before it could determine that those
regulations comported with the requirements of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act of 1970. Second, the court applied the "substantial evi-
dence"' standard of judicial review to all of the decisions made by the
Secretary' - both factual determinations and policy conclusions.
1. For an example of the United States Supreme Court's reasoning for giving great defer-
ence to an agency's interpretation of an administrative regulation, see Udall v. Tallman, 380
U.S. 1, 16-18 (1965) (finding that the Secretary of the Interior's interpretation of regulations
concerning the issuance of oil and gas leases was "not unreasonable," the Court deferred to
that interpretation). But, for a more-recent decision in which the Supreme Court exhibited
considerably less deference to an administrative agency, see Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (the Court, after a "probing" examination of the
Secretary of Transportation's decision to authorize highway construction through a public
park, reversed and remanded the case for plenary review).
2. 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1978) (hereinafter cited as API), transferred from D.C. Circuit,
570 F.2d 965 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
3. Hereinafter referred to as OSHA.
4. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 99 S.Ct. 1212 (1979) (certiorari
granted). Oral argument was on October 10, 1979. 48 U.S.L.W. 3256.
5. For an explanation of the Fifth Circuit's application of the risk-benefit-cost test in API,
see notes 44-46 infra and accompanying text. For a thorough, detailed discussion of risk-
benefit-cost analysis, see Symposium-Risk-Benefit Assessment in Governmental
Decisionmaking, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 901 (1977).
6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-78 (1976) (hereinafter referred to as the Act or OSH Act).
7. Id. at § 655(f).
8. "The term 'Secretary' means the Secretary of Labor." Id. § 652(1) (hereinafter the terms
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The Fifth Circuit, in imposing the risk-benefit-cost analysis, and in
applying the substantial evidence test as it did, does not attempt to recon-
cile its decision with the existing body of case law.9 Whether or not the API
case can be reconciled with existing case law, this comment will compare
the Fifth Circuit's rationale with the opinions of other courts which have
considered similar issues, and thereby illustrate the dimensions of the
Fifth Circuit's activism. First, the background of the API case and some
of the special problems raised by the technical and scientific nature of the
evidence presented in the case will be discussed. Second, the risk-benefit-
cost test will be examined in light of existing judicial and administrative
precedent. Third, the scope of substantial evidence review as applied in
the API case versus its application in previous cases will be analyzed.
II. THE API CASE
A. Background of the Case
Benzene,'5 the subject of regulatory controversy in this case, has been
recognized as causing serious non-malignant responses in humans" since
the turn of the century.'2 As a result of its toxicity': (not its potential
carcinogenic effects), benzene has been regulated since 1927.'1 In 1971,
OSHA adopted the existing national consensus standard '5 limiting the
permissible exposure level to ten parts per million (PPM).' Subsequent to
"Secretary" and "OSHA" will be used interchangeably).
9. "We will not attempt to reconcile our decision with the cases from other circuits which
uphold other standards regulating exposure to carcinogens." 581 F.2d at 505.
10. The chemical benzene (C6H6) is a colorless, highly flammable liquid, produced primar-
ily by the petrochemical and petroleum refining industries. Approximately 86 percent of the
benzene produced is used as an intermediate in the production of other organic chemicals.
Current users of benzene include the chemical, printing, lithograph, rubber cement, rubber
fabricating, paint, varnish, stain remover, adhesive, and petroleum industries. 43 Fed. Reg.
5,918 (1978).
11. Acute effects of exposure to benzene at relatively high levels (between 500 parts per
million [PPM] and 20,000 PPM) produce symptoms of headache, nausea, euphoria and
nervous excitation. Exposure to benzene concentrations near 20,000 PPM is fatal within
minutes. Id. at 5,921.
12. Id. at 5,918.
13. Id. at 5,919.
14. Id. at 5,918.
15. For a period of two years after the adoption of the OSH Act, the Secretary was author-
ized by Congress to adopt any national consensus standard without regard to the rule-making
procedures set forth in the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 655(a)(1976). National consensus standards are
defined as standards "promulgated by a nationally recognized standards-producing organiza-
tion . . ." Id. § 652 (9). For a critical review of OSHA's hasty adoption of these standards,
see, Moran, Occupational Safety and Health Standards as Federal Law: The Hazards of
Haste, 15 WM. & MARY L. REv. 777 (1974).
16. The benzene national consensus standard was a 1969, American National Standards
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the enactment of this standard, OSHA initiated a series of rule-making
procedures to reduce the ten PPM exposure level" as a result of scientific
studies suggesting a link between benzene and leukemia.'" These proce-
dures culminated in the adoption of the one PPM' 9 permanent standard20
challenged by industrial producers and users2' in API.
B. The Evidentiary Problems Presented by API
Before promulgating any toxic substance regulation, OSHA is required
to examine the most reliable and most recent scientific evidence avail-
able. 22 The obvious policy behind this statutory provision is to prevent
OSHA from regulating relatively harmless substances, or regulating dan-
gerous substances by meaningless or arbitrary methods. But this reliance
on highly technical, scientific data creates problems for courts called on
Institute standard. 43 Fed. Reg. 5,919 (1978). This standard permits exposure to 10 parts
benzene per million parts of air (PPM), as averaged over an eight-hour day. It also allows
the level of benzene to reach 50 PPM for a maximum of 10 minutes over an eight-hour shift.
29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000 (1978) (Table Z-2).
17. In January, 1977, OSHA issued voluntary "Guidelines for Control of Occupational
Exposure to Benzene," recommending that the exposure level of benzene be reduced to one
PPM. 43 Fed. Reg. 5,919 (1978). In May, 1977 OSHA issued an "Emergency Temporary
Standard" for benzene, published in 42 Fed. Reg. 22,516 (1977). The OSH Act authorizes the
Secretary to itsue "Emergency temporary standards" if "necessary" to protect employees
from "grave danger." 29 U.S.C. § 655(c) (1976). The emergency regulation never became
effective as a result of a temporary restraining order issued by the Fifth Circuit. 43 Fed. Reg.
5,919 (1978).
18. OSHA received information suggesting that benzene was a suspect leukemogen from
the National Academy of Sciences and the National Institute of Occupational Safety and
Health (hereinafter referred to as NIOSH). 43 Fed. Reg. 5,919 (1978). NIOSH is a research
organization under the Department of Health, Education and Welfare. Under the OSH Act
it conducts research and makes recommendations for occupational safety and health stan-
dards. 29 U.S.C. § 671 (1976).
19. In addition to the reduction of exposure levels from 10 PPM to one PPM, the standard
imposes upon affected industries the duty to monitor benzene concentrations in the occupa-
tional environment, implement engineering and work practice controls, utilize respiratory
protection, provide protective clothing, institute medical surveillance and employee training
programs, and maintain records of the monitoring and medical programs. The stan'dard is
designed to protect employees not only from benzene in the air, but also prohibits dermal
contact and requires that containers of benzene carry specific labels. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1028
(1978). This comment will limit its discussion to the one PPM benzene exposure provision of
the standard.
20. OSHA is authorized to promulgate permanent toxic substance standards by 29 U.S.C.
§ 655(b) (1976). OSHA's statement of reasons is published in 43 Fed. Reg. 5,918 (1978), as
required by that section of the OSH Act.
21. 581 F.2d at 495 n.1.
22. OSHA is required to examine the "best available evidence," to develop its standards
based upon "research, demonstrations, (and) experiments," considering "the latest available
scientific data in the field." 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (1976).
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to review OSHA standards. The courts' lack of expertise in scientific mat-
ters may have some bearing on their willingness to defer to OSHA's judg-
ments, which are necessarily grounded upon complex technical evidence.?
Although the Fifth Circuit does not appear to have been intimidated by
the difficulties of analyzing scientific information,24 its problems were ex-
acerbated by the intermittent dearth of information in the record. Thus
the court, in addition to weighing scientific evidence, had to determine the
dispositive impact of the lack of scientific information.
API presented at least three instances in which the court had to face the
issue of inconclusive technical information. First, OSHA's decision to regu-
late benzene exposure is wholly predicated on its assumption that this
substance causes cancer." Since the scientific community has yet to prove
that causation,2" OSHA's assumption is based on epidemiological studies
which correlate2 the incidence of leukemia with exposure to benzene.2 1
However, the court did not require OSHA to prove what is beyond the
current capabilities of scientific research, and accepted OSHA's premise
that benzene is carcinogenic."
Second, the epidemological study upon which OSHA relied most heavily
to support its determination that the ten PPM exposure should be reduced,
was conducted in an enviroment containing 150 PPM benzene.', Although
the court did not directly discuss the fallibility of this study, its questiona-
ble applicability to OSHA's standards was clearly a factor in the court's
23. Cf., Synthetic Organic Chemical Mfs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974)
(See text infra, beginning at note 102 for discussion of the Third Circuit's reluctance to apply
the stricter standard of review to the factual findings of the Secretary.)
24. "We are not persuaded by OSHA's argument that this standard should be upheld since
the lack of knowledge concerning the effects of exposure to benzene at low levels makes an
estimate of benefits . . . impossible." 581 F.2d at 504 (footnote omitted in which the court
discusses ways in which OSHA can estimate benefits).
25. 581 F.2d at 501.
26. See 581 F.2d at 504 n.25; 43 Fed. Reg. 5,930-33 (1978).
27. "The study of the incidence and distribution of physical. . . disorders in a population
is referred to as epidemiology. The epidemiological approach serves to indicate both 'high-
risk' areas and groups and the . . . conditions that are correlated with a high incidence of
given disorders." J. COLEMAN, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY IN MODERN LIFE 79 (5th ed. 1964).
28. "The knowledge of a correlation . . . carries with it a strong temptation to conclude
that one variable causes the other . . . . [lit is important to note that the existence of a
correlation between two variables implies nothing about a causal relationship." G. KIMBLE &
N. GARMEZY, PRINCIPLES OF GENERAL PSYCHOLOGY 65 (2nd ed. 1963) (chapter on statistical
methods).
29. Data regarding the carcinogenic effects of benzene could also be extrapolated from
animal studies. 581 F.2d at 504 n.25.
30. Id. at 504 (nowhere in its opinion did the court contravert OSHA's premise that ben-
zene is a suspected leukemogen).
31. Id. at 498-99 n.13.
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determination that the federal agency's justification of the benzene stan-
dard was deficient.2
Third, OSHA justified its reduction of the permissible benzene exposure
level from ten to one PPM based on the fact that no known safe exposure
level exists.? The court held that the division in the scientific community
over the existence of a safe threshold level of exposure provided sufficient
evidence of a risk at the ten PPM level.3 4 However, this lack of scientific
consensus did not support OSHA's finding that the reduction to one PPM
was "reasonably necessary."-"
The court's rationale is anomolous, and demonstrates the hazards of
interpreting scientific data (or the lack thereof). Scientists are divided over
the safe threshold issue because they have been unable to establish a dose-
response curve for benzene." Thus, scientists are unable to determine at
which point (safe threshold) a given dose (level of benzene) will or will not
produce a given response (leukemia). The irony of the court's position lies
in its suggestion that OSHA provide information (i.e., a factual basis for
estimating the benefits in reducing the standard37 ) while, at the same time,
realizing that the scientific community has been unable to produce that
information (the safe threshold is normally determined by the dose-
response curve3 8).
OSHA's Congressional mandate to promote more "healthful working
conditions"39 and its amalgam of political and scientific expertise 0 seem
32. The benzene standard was deficient in the court's eyes because of OSHA's failure to
show the standard would result in appreciable benefits. Id. at 503. Later, the court said
OSHA's assumption of benefits is "based only on inferences drawn from studies involving
much higher exposure levels. Id. at 504 (emphasis added).
33. Id. at 501.
34. Id. at 503.
35. Id.
36. Dr. Kraybill of the National Cancer Institute testified at the benzene hearing:
[Wie don't really know the shape of the dose-response curve...
[Olne might envisage a threshold, but we can't comment about that because we are
fixed into the position today ... of using mathematical models and statistical studies
and what is really existing here is we don't have the biological data to tell us what is
happening down in that part of the low dose-response curve...
Tr. 775-80, reprinted in Brief for Respondents at 40, API v. OSHA, 581 F.2d 493 (5th Cir.
1978). See also, Green, The Risk-Benefit Calculus in Safety Determinations, 43 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 791, 796 (1975).
37. "OSHA must have some factual basis for an estimate of benefits .... For example,
when studies . . . are sufficient to enable a dose-response curve to be charted . . .then
OSHA will be able to make rough but educated estimates of the extent of benefits .
581 F.2d at 504 (footnotes omitted).
38. See id. at 503; note 36 supra.
39. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976).
40. NIOSH is OSHA's scientific resource group as established under the Act, note 18 supra.
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to counsel restraint in judicial review of that agency's decisions. As Dr.
iPhilip Handler, past president of the National Academy of Sciences, com-
ments, "regulatory agencies will repeatedly be confronted with the need
for decision-making with an insufficiency of data. At such times, they have
no choice; they must then err on the side of conservatism when protection
of the public health is involved. That is their role in society .
III. THE RISK-BENEFIT-COST TEST
A. The Fifth Circuit's Application of the Test
Although persuasive arguments 2 can be marshalled in favor of curbing
judicial intervention in OSHA rule-making procedures, the OSH Act does
not require the courts to rubber stamp the agency's decisions, or require
OSHA to achieve absolute safety in workplaces. The Act explicity imposes
pragmatic limitations on OSHA's commission to reduce hazards in the
occupational enviroment. The Fifth Circuit found a legislative prescription
implicit in the Act with which to judge OSHA's regulations in terms of the
risk, benefit, and cost involved.
The policy behind the court's risk-benefit-cost test appears to be that
unless OSHA properly assesses and balances these factors, the agency will
be unable to allocate its (or, more correctly, industry's) finite resources to"assure maximum benefit . . . and thus carry out Congress' overriding
policy . . .,,"
As employed in API, the risk-benefit-cost test directs OSHA to show: (1)
that the existing ten PPM exposure level poses a health risk," (2) that the
one PPM standard will reduce that risk, i.e., will be of "appreciable" or"measurable" benefit,45 and (3) that the one-half billion dollar cost of
OSHA performs a legislative-like function by regulating all businesses affecting interstate
commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1976).
41. Green, supra note 36, at 801.
42. See text beginning at note 23 supra for a discussion of the problems encountered by
the courts in evaluating scientific evidence; text beginning at note 98 infra, for a discussion
of the cases before API which generally refrained from questioning the propriety of the specific
methods used by OSHA to protect workers.
43. 581 F.2d at 501. See also RMI Co. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1979).
In that case, the Sixth Circuit, reviewing a decision of the Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission [hereinafter referred to as OSHRC], adopted a cost-benefit framework
for determining the economic feasibility of an OSHA noise control regulation. The court
approved of OSHRC's position that "the costs of the proposed controls were to be balanced
against the proposed benefits . . . in order that resources would be allocated in priority to
the degree of harm established." Id. at 572. OSHRC is an independent, adjudicatory body
established by the Act to review post-enforcement, standard violations. 29 U.S.C. §§ 659-61
(1976).
44. 581 F.2d at 503.
45. Id.
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implementing the one PPM standard bears a reasonable relation to the
benefits. 4 In fact, OSHA did estimate benefits47 and costs,", but main-
tained the position that it could "not substitute cost-benefit criteria for the
legislatively determined directive of protecting all exposed employees
against material impairment of health . . . ."9 Although the court found
substantial evidence supporting the risk factor,"0 the benzene standard was
set aside because OSHA failed to quantify the benefits of reducing the
benzene exposure level from ten PPM to one PPM."5 ' Since OSHA did not
estimate benefits to the court's satisfaction the reasonableness of the cost
could not be determined.2
B. Sources of the Risk-Benefit-Cost Test
Although there is an appealing logic to the Fifth Circuit's position that
OSHA should not be allowed to squander finite resources on de minimus
health risks, the risk-benefit-cost test must be grounded in more than logic
to be legally tenable.
In general support of its test, the Fifth Circuit pointed to a number of"pragmatic limitations"' in the Act which manifest Congress' intent not
to give OSHA "unbridled discretion to adopt standards designed to create
absolutely risk-free workplaces regardless of cost." 4 Phrases such as "so far
as possible," 5 "insofar as practicable," 8 "reasonably necessary or appro-
priate, 5 7 "to the extent feasible,"58 and "material"5 9 are examples.
The "feasibility" requirement under the toxic substance provision of the
46. Id.
47. OSHA asserted the benefits of its standard with the following rationale: benzene is a
carcinogen; there is no known safe level of benzene exposure; lower levels of benzene are safer
than higher levels; therefore the one PPM standard is safer than the 10 PPM standard. 43
Fed. Reg. at 5,941.
48. OSHA commissioned a study of the economic impact of the benzene standard. The
study reported the compliance costs of each segment of the standard for each of the affected
industries. The study also examined the regulation's impact on prices, market structure,
energy, employment and productivity. Id. at 5,934-40.
49. Id. at 5,941.
50. Note 44 supra.
51. 581 F.2d at 510.
52. Id. at 504.
53. Id. at 502.
54. Id.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976).
56. Id. at § 651(b) (7).
57. Id. at § 652 (8).
58. Id. at § 655 (5).
59. Id.
1980] 629
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Act"' provides fundamental support for the cost component of this test.'
The legislative history of this section reveals that the amendment inserting
this phrase in the Act was considered an improvement over the previous
version "which might be interpreted to require absolute health and safety
in all cases, regardless of feasibility .... ."I' Moreover, OSHA has recog-
nized that the feasibility provision entails some duty to investigate the
economic consequences of its standards.13 In cases prior to API, courts have
approved of OSHA's treatment of economic issues under the feasibility
provision. In Industrial Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson64 the petition-
ing unions claimed OSHA improperly delayed the effective date of its
asbestos dust standard because it took into account the economic burdens
to the industry of immediate enforcement. 5 The court held OSHA's con-
sideration of economic burdens was proper and commented, "practical
considerations can temper protective requirements. Congress does not ap-
pear to have intended to protect employees by putting their employers out
60. The OSH Act contains a separate provision for standards regulating toxic substances
under the "Procedure for promulgation . ..of standards" subsection. Id. § 655(b). The
feasibility requirement is unique to the toxic substance provision which reads as follows:
(5) The Secretary, in promulgating standards dealing with toxic materials or harmful
physical agents under this subsection, shall set the standard which most adequately
assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, that no
employee will suffer material impairment of health or functional capacity even if such
employee has regular exposure to the hazard dealt with by such standard for the period
of his working life. Development of standards under this subsection shall be based
upon research, demonstrations, experiments, and such other information as may be
appropriate. In addition to the attainment of the highest degree of health and safety
protection for the employee, other considerations shall be the latest available scientific
data in the field, the feasibility of the standards, and experience gained under this and
other health and safety laws. Whenever practicable, the standard promulgated shall
be expressed in terms of objective criteria and of the performance desired. Id. §
655(b)(5) (emphasis added).
61. It is suggested that the feasibility requirement is preferable to the "reasonable neces-
sity" language of the Act, as statutory support for the risk-benefit-cost test. See note 78 infra.
The Fifth Circuit's reliance on the OSH Act's "reasonable necessity" language is subject to
serious criticism. See text beginning at note 76 infra for a discussion of the court's reliance
on this language of the Act. The American Petroleum Institute, apparently recognizing the
weakness of the Fifth Circuit's opinion on this issue, emphasizes the "feasibility" requirement
in their brief to the Supreme Court to support the validity of the risk-cost-benefit test. Brief
for Respondents at 41-47, Industrial Union Dep't. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., cert. granted, 99
S. Ct. 1212 (1979) (argued October 10, 1979).
62. S. REP. No. 1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 58, reprinted in [19701 U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEws 5222 (Individual views of Sen. Javits).
63. 43 Fed. Reg. at 5,934. In addition, OSHRC has consistently held that economic factors
are of primary importance in evaluating OSHA regulations. See, e.g., RMI Co. v. Secretary
of Labor, 594 F.2d 566 (6th Cir. 1979); Atlantic Steel Co., [1977-781 OSHD (CCH) 22,483,
(1978); Continental Can Co. [1976-77] OSHD (CCH) 21,009, (1976).
64. 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
65. Id. at 477.
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of business." 6 The Third Circuit followed suit in AFL-CIO v. Brennan6
and sanctioned OSHA's consideration of economic feasibility in the
agency's decision to eliminate certain provisions in its mechanical power
press regulation."'
Case law that speaks approvingly of OSHA's attention to the financial
burdens of its standards does not, however, provide adequate support for
the Fifth Circuit's decision to set aside a standard for OSHA's failure to
justify those burdens in terms of quantified benefits. The source of the risk-
benefit-cost test applied in API is found in Aqua Slide 'N' Dive Corp. v.
Consumer Product Safety Commission." The court made numerous refer-
ences to Aqua Slide in articulating its test in the API case, 0 and drew
parallels between the similar purposes 7' and the rule-making procedures72
of the Consumer Product Safety Act73 (upon which Aqua Slide was based),
and the OSH Act. Although the risk-benefit-cost test may be justified on
other grounds, the Fifth Circuit's reliance on a case interpreting a different
statute is questionable.7 1
The Consumer Act expressly requires the Consumer Product Safety
Commission to consider risk, benefit and cost factors in promulgating its
rules,7" whereas the OSH Act merely requires its toxic substance regula.-
66. Id. at 477-78. The court qualified this comment, however, stating that standards may
be feasible even though they are "financially burdensome" or cause the "economic demise of
an employer who has lagged behind the rest of the industry . . . and is consequently finan-
cially unable to comply with the new standards as quickly as other employers." Id. at 478
(footnote omitted).
67. 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975).
68. "Undoubtedly the most certain way to eliminate industrial hazards is to eliminate
industry. But the congressional statement of. . . policy . . . shows that the upgrading of
working conditions, not the complete elimination of hazardous occupations, was the domi-
nant intention." Id. at 121 (footnote omitted).
69. 569 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1978) (hereinafter referred to as Aqua Slide). In this case, the
court set aside a standard requiring manufacturers of sliding boards to place warning signs
and ladder chain devices on their products. The court concluded:
In evaluating the "reasonable necessity" for a standard, the Commission has a duty
to take a hard look, not only at the nature and severity of the risk, but also at the
potential the standard has for reducing the severity or frequency of the injury, and the
effect the standard would have on the utility, cost or availability of the product.
Id. at 844.
70. 581 F.2d at 501, 502, 503, 504, 505.
71. Id. at 502.
72. Id.
73. 15 U.S.C. § 2051 (1972) (hereinafter referred to as Consumer Act).
74. Note 61 supra.
75. "[The Commission shall consider. . . the degree and nature of the risk of injury. ..
[andl the probable effect [of the standard] upon the utility, cost, or availability of . . .
[regulated] products . . . while minimizing adverse effects on competition . . . and other
commercial practices." 15 U.S.C. § 2058(c)(1).
1980]
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tions to be feasible."M In addition, the "reasonable necessity" language of
the Consumer Act" is considerably more forceful than similar language in
the OSH Act.58 Finally, the nature of the hazardous instrumentalities
against which the respective statutes seek to protect, defy comparison."
Congress made special provisions in the OSH Act for standards relating
to toxic substances such as benzene, in apparent recognition of the differ-
ences between insidious chemical hazards, and safety hazards'" (which
may be more analagous to hazards protected by the Consumer Act). One
commentator has observed that toxic substances "present persistant and
severe regulatory problems which defy the use of traditional cost-benefit
techniques." 8' Cited illustrations of these particular problems are: uniden-
tified safe exposure levels, increasing costs for each increment of exposure
reduction, and the impossibility of making objective, reliable cost-benefit
comparisons."2 In contrast, safety objectives involved in the regulation of
tangible instrumentalities may more easily be identified and the costs of
implementing more often involve a single, initial alteration of production
processes or design. 3
IV. "SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE" REVIEW
Although it is clear that OSHA must consider the best available scien-
tific evidence and the feasibility of its regulations, s4 the standard of review
the court should apply to the Secretary's conclusions is unsettled. The
standard enunciated in the OSH Act simply states that "[tihe determina-
tions of the Secretary shall be conclusive if supported by substantial evi-
dence in the record considered as a whole."85 But the simplicity of this
76. Note 60 supra.
77. "The Commission shall not promulgate a consumer product safety rule unless it finds
... that the rule ... is reasonably necessary." 15 U.S.C. § 2058(c)(2)(A).
78. The "reasonably necessary" language appears in the definition section of the OSH Act,
defining an "occupational safety and health standard." 29 U.S.C. § "652(8).
79. The Consumer Act protects against hazardous tangible acticles "for sale to a consumer
for use in or around a .. .household or .. .school." 15 U.S.C. § 2052(a)(1). In contrast,
the toxic substance provision is designed to protect against the insidious effects of chemicals.
As with benzene, employees may be unaware of their exposure, or of the long-term effects of
exposure. 43 Fed. Reg. at 5,920.
80. Note 60 supra.
81. Berger, Economic and Technological Feasibility in Regulating Toxic Substances Under
the Occupational Safety and Health Act, 7 ECOLOGY L.Q. 285, 286 (1978).
82. Id. at 287.
83. Cf. D.D. Bean & Sons v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm., 574 F.2d 643 (1978) (the
design of a safer matchbook required in part a modification of manufacturing processes so
that the staple metal did not touch the flint), with Aqua Slide, 569 F.2d 381 (the objective
in this case was to prevent improper use of sliding boards).
84. Note 60 supra.
85. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f).
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language belies the complexity of the standard's application.
Implementation of substantial evidence review poses conceptual prob-
lems for the courts because it conventionally follows formal rule-making
procedures, 6 and not the informal, "notice and comment" rule-making
which characterize OSHA procedures. 7 This "absence of statutory har-
mony with respect to the nature and scope of review"" under the OSH Act
has been criticized by courts and commentators alike,89 as fostering an"uneasy partnership"99 between administrative agencies and the judiciary.
An additional difficulty arises as the courts try to accommodate9' the
statute's "in the record"92 requirement with the "sieve-like characteris-
tics" 3 of the record produced by informal procedures. Although OSHA has
taken steps to formalize its record,94 courts are still faced with the incon-
gruent task of applying substantial evidence review to a record "untested
by anything approaching the adversary process."95
A. Substantial Evidence Review in Cases Before API
Once apprised of the conceptual and practical inconsistencies built into
the OSH Act, it is not surprising that courts before API were reluctant to
utilize substantial evidence review in full force. The first court to face this'
86. See, Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1976). Formal rule-making
procedures under this Act require detailed factual records, provisions for cross-examination
and other elements characteristic of the adjudicatory process. Substantial evidence review is
applicable.
87. See 29 U.S.C. § 655. The standards under the OSH Act are promulgated after notice
is published in the FEDERAL REGISTER, and an informal hearing if one is requested. Id. at §
655(b)(2)-(4). This is similar to "notice and comment" rule-making under the Administrative
Procedure Act, to which the "arbitrary and capricious" standard of judicial review applies. 5
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1976).
88. Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 487 F.2d 342,
345 (2d Cir. 1973) (footnote omitted).
89. E.g., Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301 (2d Cir. 1975); Synthetic
Organic Chemicals Mfr.'s Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155"(3d Cir. 1974); Industrial Union
Dep't, AFL-CIO v. Hodgson, 499 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Berger, note 81 supra at 297-99;
Taylor, Reasonable R ulemaking Under OSHA: Is it Feasible?, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 215, 221-25
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Taylor].
90. Associated Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. United States, 487 F.2d at 354.
91. One commentator has observed that the courts rely heavily on the statement of reasons
OSHA publishes in the FEDERAL REGISTER to delineate the "areas of uncertainty and dispute,"
and as a source of "available facts." Berger, note 81 supra at 298-99.
92. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f).
93. Verkuil, Judicial Review of Informal Rulemaking, 60 VA. L. REv. 185, 228 (1974).
94. Examples of the steps OSHA has taken to formalize its record are: (1) requiring a
qualified hearing examiner to preside over oral hearings, (2) permitting cross-examination of
witnesses during the hearings, and (3) having a verbatum transcript made. 499 F.2d at 474.
95. Id.
1980]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW
issue, in Associated Industries, Inc. v. United States Department of Labor
professed to apply substantial evidence review to the whole record." A
careful reading of the court's opinion, however, reveals that the standard
actually applied is more akin to the less strict "arbitrary and capricious"
review which is the usual standard of review associated with an informal
administrative record. 7 In the following year, the D.C. Circuit, in
Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO v. Hodgson5 articulated the basic stan-
dard of review followed by the courts until API 9 In Hodgson, Judge McGo-
wan sustained OSHA's asbestos dust regulation utilizing a bifurcated stan-
dard of review. OSHA's factual determinations were subjected to substan-
tial evidence review, but the "inferences of policy drawn from those facts
[were weighed] in terms of their freedom from arbitrariness or irrational-ity".100
Although most courts after Hodgson have applied the more deferential"arbitrary and capricious" review to OSHA's policy conclusions,"" at least
one court has expanded that notion of policy to include some factual deter-
minations. In Synthetic Organic Chemicals Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan,
OSHA's regulation of ethyleneimine (EI) was challenged because of a lack
of scientific evidence supporting OSHA's determination that EI was car-
cinogenic. 02 In view of this evidentiary void, the Third Circuit treated
OSHA's assertion of, the chemical's carcinogencity as a policy matter,0 3
applied the "arbitrary and capricious" standard, and sustained the regula-
tion. 04
96. 487 F.2d at 349. In this case, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals vacated OSHA's
standard which required a minimum number of lavatories for industrial establishments.
97. "The paramount objective is to see whether the agency, given an essentially legislative
task to perform has carried it out in a manner calculated to negate the dangers of arbitrariness
and irrationality." Id. at 354 (quoting Automotive Parts & Accessories Ass'n v. Boyd, 407 F.2d
330, 338 (D.C. Cir. 1968)).
98. 449 F.2d 467.
99. E.g., American Iron & Steel Inst. v. OSHA, 577 F.2d 825 (3d Cir. 1978); AFL-CIO v.
Brennan, 530 F.2d 109 (3d Cir. 1975); Society of Plastics Indus., Inc. v. OSHA, 509 F.2d 1301
(2d Cir. 1975); Synthetic Organic Chem. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Brennan, 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974).
100. 499 F.2d at 473. The court discussed the problems of applying substantial evidence
review to an informal fecord-a record characterized by inconclusive data to support issues
"on the frontiers of scientific knowledge." Id. at 474. The court concluded: "Regardless of the
manner in which the task of judicial review is articulated, policy choices. . . are not suscepti-
ble to the same type of verification or refutation by reference to the record as are some factual
questions." Id. at 475.
101. See note 99, supra.
102. 503 F.2d 1155 (3d Cir. 1974).
103. Taylor, note 89 supra at 228.
104. Compare the Third Circuit's treatment of scientific evidence (or lack thereof) with the
Fifth Circuit's treatment. See text after note 23 supra.
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Some commentators have suggested that the distinction between"substantial' evidence" and "arbitrary and capricious" review is a mere
semantic one.' 5 However, in view of the degree of judicial deference af-
forded OSHA in the cases after Hodgson and before API, "I and the conse-
quent wholesale approval of the OSHA regulations reviewed in those cases,
it is more likely that the two standards of review "although not theoreti-
cally distinct . . . do reflect judicial attitudes which may affect the out-
come of the case.' '0 7
B. The Fifth Circuit's Version of Substantial Evidence Review
Notwithstanding the ramifications of the risk-benefit-cost test, the Fifth
Circuit's treatment of substantial evidence review exemplifies the court's
judicial activism. Even the proposed risk-benefit-cost test loses its bite
unless its elements are required to be supported by substantial evidence.
Rather than following the diluted version of substantial evidence review
as dictated by precedent, the Fifth Circuit treated the standard as yet
another restrictive aspect of the statutory scheme' 8 and applied substan-
tial evidence review to all of the "determinations of the Secretary."'' 9 As
translated into the court's analytical framework, this means that OSHA's
factual determinations and policy conclusions must show by substantial
evidence that a risk exists, that the standard will appreciably reduce that
risk, and that on balance the costs are justified by the benefits."'0 The
benzene standard was set aside because OSHA failed to show by substan-
tial evidence that the reduction of permissible benzene exposure levels
from ten PPM to one PPM would result in appreciable benefits to work-
ers.'
Despite earlier judicial deference, support for the Fifth Circuit's exten-
sive application of substantial evidence review is found in the OSH Act
itself which expressly"2 requires this strict review, and in the legislative
history. As initially introduced in the House and Senate, the bill which
would eventually become the OSH Act, vested the responsibility for pro-
mulgation, investigation, prosecution and adjudication of regulations in
the Secretary of Labor."' This version of the bill was criticized by numer-
105. Scalia & Goodman, Procedural Aspects of the Consumer Product Safety Act, 20
U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 899, 935 at n. 138 (1973).
106. See notes 98-102, supra and accompanying text.
107. Taylor, note 89, supra at 223.
108. API v. OSHA, 581 F.2d at 497.
109. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f).
110. 581 F.2d at 503.
111. Id. at 510.
112. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f).
113. S. REP. No. 2193, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
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ous legislators"' who feared it might result in "frivolous disruptions of
industrial production."" 5 Eventually a compromise was reached,1 6 appeas-
ing opponents of the bill. The authority for promulgating regulations was
left in the hands of the Secretary in exchange for the stricter "substantial
evidence" review." '7 Thus, it appears the legislators attached great weight
to the substantial evidence provision of the statute in hopes that it might
hedge against "arbitrary and arrogant administration by the U.S. Dept.
of Labor.""" In view of the uncompromised language of the statute and its
legislative history it is difficult to quarrel with the Fifth Circuit's applica-
tion of substantial evidence review to all of the "determinations of the
Secretary.""' 9
V. CONCLUSIONS
Seemingly insoluble problems have been raised by API. Congress has
composed a statute fraught with inconsistencies and conflicts. Courts are
required to evaluate informal rule-making, on the record, with a standard
of review normally applied to records tempered by adjudicatory-like proce-
dures. OSHA must protect workers from elusive hazards with feasible
standards, utilizing the best available scientific evidence. Scientists are
unable to supply OSHA with the data it needs to make the practical
decisions it must. Industry balks under the enormous costs,'20 and workers
petition for protection.
OSH ACT at 729-30, 735-42 (1971) (Congressional Information Service: call number,
Y4.LII/2:Sal/5; microfiche accession number, S542-17 (1971)).
114. Senator Cook criticized the arbitrary and capricious standard of review as inadequate
to protect employers: "[Ilt will be very, very strange if they (employers) ever win a case
.... [Tihey are just not going to win any lawsuits." Id. at 344.
115. Id. at 420.
116. The compromise was reached in the Conference Committee. Id. at 1185.
117. Senator Steiger urged his colleagues to approve the Conference Report since the inclu-
sion of the stricter substantial evidence review would protect employer interests:
The Secretary's standard will only be sustained by the court if it is supported by
"substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole." Thus, the Secretary must
have a record on which to base his findings and to serve as the basis for judicial review.
The act does not provide for an independent board for standard-setting as did the
House bill. However, court review based upon substantial evidence provides a suffi-
cient element of fairness to satisfy me that the conference report should be adopted.
Id. at 1218.
118. Id. at 1080.
119. 29 U.S.C. § 655(f).
120. A recent study reveals that OSHA's regulation of toxic and hazardous substances has
caused the highest incremental increase in cost to industry of any area of regulation related
to OSHA. In addition, the study reports that the chemical industry is primarily concerned
about the reasonableness of specific limits set for exposure to toxic chemicals, although most
of the companies studied agreed that some control of worker exposure to these chemicals was
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From this quagmire of political, scientific and legal discord, the question
rises-what is the role of the judiciary in the resolution of these issues?
According to the courts' decisions before API, OSHA was given wide latti-
tude to resolve the statutory inconsistencies and interpret scientific data,
in formulating its standards. The Fifth Circuit however, more actively
participated in the rule-making process, finding that the OSH Act implic-
itly requires toxic-substance standards to be justified by substantial evi-
dence in terms of risk, benefit and cost.
Outside the ideal of attaining absolute safety in the occupational envi-
ronment, few would quarrel with the policy behind the Fifth Circuit's
opinion. That is, given the constraint of finite resources, OSHA must uti-
lize those resources expediently, by applying them to improve conditions
causing the greatest harm to workers. Whether or not the methodology
employed by the Fifth Circuit to effectuate this policy is legitimate is the
most obvious issue presented to the Supreme Court on review. But indi-
rectly, that Court's opinion will determine the degree to which these prag-
matic considerations can temper the goal of a healthy occupational envi-
ronment, and whether the Fifth Circuit's brand of judicial activism fores-
hadows the future role of the courts in administrative policy-making.
Elizabeth C. Gay
necessary. Cost of Government Regulation Study for the Business Roundtable 8-8, 8-20
(March, 1978) (A study of the direct incremental costs incurred by 48 companies in complying
with the regulations of six federal agencies in 1977, conducted by Arthur Anderson & Co.).
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